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THE SECOND GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION AND THE LEFT 
 
My point of departure is the question as to the 
historical locus of the present multidimen-
sional crisis. The difficulty in answering it is 
that the historical significance of a situation is 
as a rule difficult to grasp for those living 
within it. 
All the greater is the responsibility of intellec-
tuals to address such a question. My thesis is: 
the most recent societal crisis, which has not 
at all ended with the abatement of the financial 
crisis and the overcoming of the world eco-
nomic crisis, could be seen as the beginning of 
a fundamental watershed in global develop-
ment. Following on ‚The Great Transforma-
tion‛, which Karl Polanyi analysed in his work 
with that title, nothing less than a Second 
Great Transformation is now entering onto the 
historical agenda, a transformation which will 
revolutionise all spheres of societal life on 
earth. 
The First Great Transformation encompassed 
the transition from feudalism, from the small-
scale production of goods, the subsistence 
economy and other pre-capitalist forms, to the 
capitalist mode of the production of commodi-
ties. As a result of this process, which took 
more than 300 years (Kossok, 1988: 42), profit 
came to dominate the economy and society, 
and the economy was no longer integrated 
into society; rather society was subordinated 
to the economy. Nature has been incorporated 
into the process of the valorisation of capital as 
if it were limitlessly available, and as if the eco-
logical balance could be arbitrarily and without 
consequence sacrificed to capitalist growth. 
THE DISCOURSE ON 
TRANSFORMATION, 1989 AND 
2009 
The neo-liberal capitalism of the past decades 
has driven this development to its climax, and 
has resulted in the present crisis. This has con-
stituted a historical crossroads situation. All 
societal forces feel constrained to seek an-
swers to the question of which way they want 
to go in future. The interpretation of a crisis 
situation itself sets the course for the manner 
and direction to be taken in dealing with it. 
Gaining sovereignty over that interpretation 
will mean being able to determine first that 
reactions to the crisis will be in one’s own in-
terest. Loss of that sovereignty will put one 
well on the way to losing the battle for the 
thereafter. 
Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it 
seems reasonable to look back to the autumn 
of 1989 and the ensuing years, from that point 
of view. The upheavals of history always in-
clude an incalculable stock of cognition and 
experience, be they obtained through victories 
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or defeats. They can be made to come alive for 
the tasks of the present. Walter Benjamin 
wrote: ‚The living at any given time see them-
selves as being at the noon of history. They are 
called upon to prepare a meal for the past. The 
historian is the herald who bids the bygone to 
dine.‛ (Benjamin, 1984: 155). 
The challenges of the autumn of ‘89 were in-
terpreted by the power elites of the West as a 
task of ‚catch-up modernisation‛ (Zapf 1992) 
or ‚catch-up revolution‛ (Habermas, 1990) in 
East Germany and eastern Europe. Wolf 
Lepenies’ findings were: ‚The political class of 
old West Germany, with few exceptions, 
turned unification and its results into a festival 
of self-affirmation.‛ (Lepenies, 1992: 31). They 
could count on the desire of the majority of 
East Germans to gain rapid access to the liber-
ties and the prosperity which the West Ger-
man model promised. The process of German 
unification was implemented almost totally as 
an expansion of the structures of the old West 
Germany into East Germany, as a transfer of 
institutions, elites and resources from the 
West to the East. 
The mainstream of the social sciences accom-
panied the transition from state socialism to 
capitalism with a huge wave of research on 
transformation, generously funded by outside 
sources. With the goal of compiling an interna-
tional state of the art, Professor Wolfgang 
Merkel of the Berlin Social Science Research 
Centre in 1999, in his book Systemtransforma-
tion. Eine Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie 
der Transformationsforschung [System trans-
formation: An introduction to the theoretical 
and empirical aspects of transformation re-
search], summed up what he sees as the sub-
stance of transformation processes in our era 
as being ‚the transition from one system of 
order to a fundamentally different system. This 
includes the transition from dictatorships to 
democracies, from planned and fiat economies 
to market economies, and the change from 
closed to open societies.‛ (Merkel, 1999: 15). 
Yet the perspective of a transformation from 
representative to participatory democracies, 
from a profit-oriented market economy to a 
mixed economy based on solidarity with a 
strong social property component and a socio-
ecological framework limiting the market, from 
open societies whose openness is in fact to a 
large extent a fiction due to the social exclu-
sion of large parts of the earth’s population, to 
truly open societies with socially equal partici-
pation by all of earth’s citizens in the most 
elementary conditions of a self-determined life 
– all these remain beyond the thought horizon 
of the established scientific community. The 
property, command and power relationships of 
the OECD world have not been called into 
question. Ulrich Beck made clear what was 
meant by the transformation concept of the 
ruling elites: ‚Market economy – and no back-
talk!‛ 
This was based on a constricted view of the 
actual historical challenges pertaining at the 
end of the twentieth century. State socialism 
had failed because of the deficits of its basic 
structures. Its overthrow was long and ur-
gently overdue. However, since the seventies, 
capitalism, which had until then been regu-
lated by the welfare state, was also on an ever 
more conflict-prone path of neo-liberalism. 
Radical high-tech changes and globalisation 
had brought forth increases in wealth, with 
previously undreamed-of opportunities, along 
with very great dangers for human civilisation. 
Since the military coup in Chile in 1973, the 
implementation of the market-radical eco-
nomic theory of Milton Friedman was prac-
tised there. The dismantling of the welfare 
state was well underway, particularly in the 
USA and in Great Britain, but had already 
made progress in Germany, too, before getting 
a decisive push in the form of Chancellor Ger-
hard Schröder’s Agenda 2010. The report The 
Limits to Growth by the Club of Rome had 
long since spectacularly pointed to the endan-
germent of the natural existence conditions of 
humankind by profit-oriented growth. For the 
developing countries, the eighties were a lost 
decade. 
For that reason, the concept of ‚dual moderni-
sation‛ was developed at the Institute for In-
terdisciplinary Civilisation Research of the 
Humboldt University of Berlin, which had 
emerged from the reform-critical project 
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‚Modern Socialism‛1 (Klein 1990; Klein 1991): 
a transformation process in the West, after 
two decades of neoliberal development, to a 
just society of solidarity; and a transformation 
in the East, designed to acquire the evolution-
ary potentials of modern bourgeois societies, 
while carrying its own experiences into a pan-
European transformation process. 
Of course this transformation strategy contra-
dicted the real relationship of forces. But the 
question is, in view of today’s challenges for 
anticipatory thinking, whether this fact makes 
it legitimate for responsibly thinking people, 
especially intellectuals, to trade in reality-
referenced, future-oriented ideas for the ac-
clamation accruing to politics which ignores 
the really big questions of our time. 
Max Weber wrote of such conflicts: ‚For the 
individual Of course, a constantly recurring 
problem is whether he must give up hope of 
the feasibility of his practical results, in view of 
his awareness of an obvious development 
trend which makes the implementation of 
what he strives for … seem so improbable that 
his labours, assessed in terms of their chances 
of success, must appear as sterile, quixotic 
behaviour.‛ (Weber 1988: 513). In such cases, 
Weber considered the possibility that people 
would tend to surrender their ideals under 
such pressure, and concluded – in terms rele-
vant to the present – that, ‚In Germany, one 
seems constrained to adorn this with the label 
‘Realpolitik’. At all events, it is not logical for 
representatives … of a science, of all things, to 
feel the need to do so by constituting itself as 
a round of applause for the respective ‘devel-
opment trend’ (ibid). The specific function of 
science seems to me just the opposite: To see 
that which, in conventional terms, is natural, 
as a problem.‛ (ibid: 502). Thus cheered up by 
Weber, let us turn towards left concepts for a 
transformational society (Klein, 2002). 
                                               
1 The Institute was encouraged by Jürgen Habermas, 
Cornelius Castoriades, Günter Gauss and others of his 
guests, to implement its autonomous development con-
cept, was positively assessed by Jürgen Kocker – and, a 
year and a half later, was dissolved as incompatible with 
the academic structures of the old Federal Republic. 
(Brie, Michael/Klein, Dieter, 1992: 235 ff.) 
The crowding out of alternatives in the West in 
1989 and thereafter favoured an increasingly 
market-radical development of capitalism and 
an unfolding of financial-market capitalism to 
the point that it led to the recent crisis of the 
financial system and of the global economy. 
Together with the mounting damage to the 
biosphere, especially the danger to climate 
stability and the reduction of biodiversity, with 
continued poverty and hunger, an acute food 
crises, and million-fold deaths in the develop-
ing countries from illnesses which are ‚actu-
ally‛ already treatable, with wars and with the 
erosion of democracy in many regions of the 
world where it had been newly established, a 
societal crisis has emerged which involves our 
entire civilisation. 
The Frankfurter Allgemeine of 22 Oct. 2008 
wrote regarding this crisis: ‚The situation was 
so desperate that confidence in the self-
healing powers of the market alone would very 
probably have led to a catastrophe.‛ Then 
German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück 
summarised the feeling in the inner circles of 
power: ‚We were all looking into the abyss‛ 
(Der Spiegel, 29 Sep. 2008). 
In view of the crisis, the European left pre-
sented a multitude of demands to rein in the 
financial markets, to protect the citizens from 
having the social effects of the crisis dumped 
on them, and for the consolidation of the 
economy by future-oriented investment pro-
grammes in education, health, infrastructure, 
and the environment. However, neither in 
Germany nor in other countries has the left 
responded to the publicly discussed crisis of 
neo-liberalism by calling for an alternative so-
cietal project. It has not been able to introduce 
the contours of a just, future-oriented society 
into the public discourse and search for an-
swers to the crisis – as if a left societal alterna-
tive could be reduced to the sum of single 
demands and projects. At a time when the 
capitalist regulatory system has been deeply 
shaken, the power elites delegitimised, and the 
inconsistency and incompetence of the pre-
vailing political system made openly apparent, 
left-radical Realpolitik ought to have been able 
to make use of this loss of legitimacy of the 
prevailing political system and to transport the 
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inevitability of an emancipatory alternative into 
the public consciousness – without however in 
the least dispensing with practical measures 
and reforms in the immediate interest of those 
blamelessly affected by the crisis. But the left 
has yet to formulate any such fundamental 
answer to date, or at least it has failed to bring 
it into the public discourse in any noticeable 
way. In Europe, it has since the second half of 
the nineties been acting from a position of 
weakness. But the time has come to declare to 
the rulers: Your capitalistically determined 
transformation is coming to an end; the com-
ing transformation will be an emancipatory, 
social, ecological and feminist one, the sub-
stance of which will, in the long term, mean 
overcoming capitalism in favour of a just and 
sustainable society based on solidarity! Its pro-
tagonists will have to address both the failure 
of state socialism and the limits of capitalism. 
It may bear many names. The modern left will 
call it ‚democratic socialism‛. 
There are many objections to such clear 
statements. For many, the concept socialism 
appears discredited by the practice of state 
socialism. Others fear that it will be misunder-
stood as a mere utopia, irrelevant to immedi-
ate concerns and tasks. Yet others are afraid 
that programmatic debates about consistent 
left identities could splinter the left still further. 
For them, the most important thing is a hith-
erto unknown readiness for cooperation and 
communication between the various tenden-
cies and protagonists of the left. Susann 
George’s demand to ‚think big‛, especially in 
the crisis, is all too easy to ignore, in the face 
of struggles to ward off the worst effects of 
that crisis. 
FIVE SCENARIOS OF POSSIBLE 
FUTURES 
In 1989, the German and European left were 
not able to provide a transformation perspec-
tive which could also have applied to the 
West. In the present crossroads constellation, 
it should definitely learn the lessons from that 
– for contrary scenarios of possible futures are 
apparent. For the next ten years or more, the 
elements of different societal projects will exist 
next to or in opposition to one another, until 
the struggles between them are decided for 
the next phase (Institute for Social Analysis, 
1/2009). Five development paths can be ascer-
tained: 
SCENARIO I: 
A neo-liberal ‚carrying on as before‛. We will 
not describe it here in any detail. From the ex-
perience of the past three decades, we all 
know what such ‚carrying on‛ would mean 
(Candeias, 2009; Klein, 2008). 
SCENARIO II: 
A mix of neo-liberal basic tendencies and state 
intervention to the rescue. The result of this 
mix could be the paradox of a neo-liberal, 
state-interventionist capitalism and an unstable 
temporary stability. Half-hearted steps towards 
regulation of the international financial system 
and addressing climate change, together with 
the unbroken power of a finance capital which 
is now concentrated more strongly than before 
the acute crisis, are an indication of this. After 
all, the power elites have, with their emer-
gency parachutes for the banks, their refla-
tionary programmes, and emergency social 
protective measures, prevented an even 
deeper crisis. The probability of the realisation 
of this Scenario II, which is closely related to 
Scenario I, appears great. 
SCENARIO III: 
Post-neo-liberal capitalism. Under this sce-
nario, the state and civil society interventions 
would push forward a Green New Deal more 
consistently than under Scenario II. It could be 
connected to a ‚Public New Deal‛, i.e. a 
counter-movement to neo-liberal privatisation, 
for the expansion of the public sector – public 
goods, public support of basic livelihood and 
infrastructure, public ownership and public 
spaces – tied to certain elements of the pre-
sent reflationary programmes, and partially 
oriented towards Scandinavian experience. 
The failure of the neo-liberal regulatory path to 
solve the greatest challenges of our century 
moves this scenario into the realm of possibil-
ity. The weakness of the left would rather tend 
to negate the probability of this development 
path in the foreseeable future. But in this sce-
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nario too, capitalist property, control and 
power relations would continually restrict the 
unfolding of any new societal logic. At best, 
the scenario would oscillate between the pos-
sibility of an opening for further-reaching 
transformation processes, and a relapse into 
Scenario II – or even Scenario I. 
SCENARIO IV: 
De-civilised capitalism. Less probable than 
Scenarios I and II, yet not impossible would be 
an escalation of unsolved problems, and the 
loss of a capacity of governmentality by the 
elites – that is, rule with the aid of the self-
government and self-adaptation of individuals 
– so that the most conservative ruling factions 
could respond to future major crises with au-
thoritarian regimes, violence, militarisation and 
right-wing extremism. 
However, it is currently becoming apparent 
that a modified adherence to neo-liberal capi-
talism with the aid of state intervention, with 
very limited socio-political supports, and with 
green tendencies is gaining in preference 
amongst the power elites in many OECD coun-
tries. However, in the media-determined for-
mation of public opinion, a new phenomenon 
is overlaying the continued dominance of 
profit which determines Realpolitik. It consists 
of the cultural reaction of the more farsighted 
amongst the rulers, the socially conscious 
bourgeoisie and the critical educated elites 
(Neugebauer, 2007; Brie, 2007: 13 pp.) to the 
shock of the crisis. The still dominant adher-
ence to neo-liberal thinking is now being 
joined, with the growing support of the media, 
by a swelling current of more or less diffuse 
pronouncements in favour of a better, more 
just, more humane world, for an environ-
mental turn-around, and for a world of coop-
eration and solidarity. A bourgeois ‚spirit of 
saving the earth‛ is wafting through the media 
(Der Spiegel, no. 30/2007). 
This is an expression of a wide variety of inter-
ests, motivations, strategies, intellectual ten-
dencies and individual positions. After the de-
feats suffered by economic liberalism, tenden-
cies toward a revival of an ethical liberalism of 
responsibility are emerging, and combining 
with the rise of growing environmental aware-
ness. As a reaction to the imperial, arrogant 
policies of the Bush administration, Barack 
Obama’s ideas of global cooperation and 
communication are gaining in importance. 
Bourgeois humanism is challenged by acute 
mega-dangers, and is mixing with – weakened 
– social-democratic reformism, with the search 
for new, particularly green, areas of capital 
accumulation, and with the mobilisation of 
capital’s characteristic ability to incorporate 
movements and tendencies from below, and 
to integrate them into its power mechanism. 
There are plenty of indications that the overall 
result of these various approaches to a global 
renaissance of the ‚responsibility principle‛ of 
Hans Jonas could rather constitute a greater 
adaptability on the part of the power elites. But 
this new trend in the intellectual-political arena 
could harbour opportunities for transforma-
tional activity within the context of capitalism, 
and perhaps beyond that as well. The result 
could depend to a large degree on the devel-
opment of the relationship of forces between 
the ruling classes and a block for a sustainable 
society of solidarity presently only visible in its 
beginnings, from the differentiation between 
the factions of the ruling elites themselves, 
and, last but not least, from the pressure of left 
counter-power upon them. 
The left should feel alerted by the intensive 
struggles which have already broken out over 
the paths to take following the latest crisis, 
and by the threat of ‚carrying on as before‛ at 
the highest levels. The extremely ambivalent 
new discourse about responsibility, which 
largely declines to address issues of property 
and power, and disseminates an aura of non-
committalism between a hopeful new begin-
ning and the existing power structure in a new 
guise, also challenges the left to throw its 
glove into the arena of intellectual-political 
struggles for hegemony. It is called upon to 
engage in radical Realpolitik. This includes the 
further concrete development of its offered 
project in all key policy areas, work on them in 
initiatives, movements, parliaments, admini-
strations, businesses and governments, and 
the building of alliances to improve the situa-
tion of the citizens through their own efforts. 
However, left radical Realpolitik also includes 
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designs for an alternative societal project, the 
ideas of which would provide direction and a 
goal to the entire range of single political of-
fers. The challenge to the international left in 
the presently still open crossroads situation is 
the practical and theoretical conceptual work 
on a fifth scenario, on its outline for a just so-
ciety: 
SCENARIO V: 
Emancipatory transformation – to be outlined 
in the following sections: 
THE SECOND GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION: THE 
CONTENTS  
At first glance, the concept ‚emancipatory 
transformation‛ may appear to be nothing 
more than a clumsy paraphrase for a just soci-
ety of solidarity, or for democratic socialism. 
And indeed, the desired contents of this Sec-
ond Great Transformation could be described 
in these or similar terms. But it makes consid-
erable sense to understand a just society, or 
democratic socialism, as a process of trans-
formation, as opposed to possibly seeing it 
merely as a sequence of reforms in the social-
democratic tradition, or as a result of a revolu-
tion, as in the communist version. 
FIRST, 
a second great transformation would encom-
pass a revolutionary change of societal condi-
tions – between people, and between their 
classes and social groups: a society of individ-
ual freedom in which all could participate in 
the conditions of a self-determined life in so-
cial security and solidarity – that is the basic 
idea of democratic socialism. That is the guid-
ing concept not only for the future society, but 
for the transformational process, which will 
start in the midst of bourgeois society, and will 
lead beyond it. 
Individual freedom – precisely this term means 
the ubiquitous desire of the individual to de-
termine his or her own life. ‚In the western 
world, there is hardly a more widespread de-
sire than that to lead one’s own life. Anyone 
today who travels around in France, Finland, 
Poland, Switzerland, Britain, Germany, Hun-
gary, the USA or Canada, and asks what really 
moves people, for what they strive, for what 
they struggle, what they would not put up with 
having taken away from them, the answer 
could be money, a job, power, love, God, etc., 
but increasingly, too, it is the promise of one’s 
own life:… With only slight exaggeration, one 
could say: the daily struggle for one’s own life 
has become the collective experience of the 
western world.‛ (Beck, 1997: 9). 
Socially equal access to all goods and condi-
tions of life which constitute the prerequisite 
for such freedom – precisely this corresponds 
to the concepts of justice of large parts of the 
population, but is impossible due to the profit 
dominated mechanism of the market. Mean-
ingful work for a living wage, education and 
culture, high-quality health care and social se-
curity systems, democratic participation in so-
cial decisions and environmental justice in a 
peaceful world – these are the conditions for 
the free development of personality. Socially 
equal access to these basic goods for all is the 
basis of individual freedom. These goods can 
therefore be called ‚freedom goods‛. And al-
ways, such justice in all instances, also means 
gender justice. 
Solidarity is the condition for the struggle for 
social equality; it is the prerequisite for global 
cooperation as a central idea for the solution to 
the problems of humankind in the twenty-first 
century (Bahr, 2008: 264). Yet the neo-liberal 
unchaining of worldwide market competition, 
and the fight for survival of all against all, 
stands in sharp contrast to this. 
Worldwide peace is the dream of humankind. 
In Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in many other 
countries, it is daily fading away, yet it remains 
the most elementary condition of life. 
SECONDLY, 
sustainability through socio-ecological recon-
struction is part of the substance of the up-
coming alternative transformation, i.e. a revo-
lution in the relationship between society and 
nature. This is the second great basic process 
of a future transformation, together with a 
revolution of justice in the relations between 
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people. More exactly, the change of the socie-
tal means of production and of life must be so 
carried out in such a way that it includes a 
transition to a new kind of behaviour of society 
towards nature. In future, societal conditions 
must always be understood as societal-natural 
conditions. 
This will require a fundamental expansion of 
the left’s programmatic structure, and a new 
centrality of environmental policy as a central 
axis of left politics. This also applies to leftist 
parties. In this area which involves survival, the 
German LEFT PARTY has yet to take up the 
strong challenge of the Greens within the 
German party spectrum. However, it does 
have a strategic and conceptual opportunity to 
do so. The Greens see the Green New Deal, 
which is their goal, as green capitalism. The 
market and the profit mechanism are to bring 
about sustainable development and create 
jobs oriented towards green technologies. The 
opportunity for the LEFT party is, unlike the 
Greens, to push for the changes in the condi-
tions of property, control and distribution 
which will be necessary for socio-ecological 
reconstruction, to question the dominance of 
profit, and to avoid an overestimation of mar-
ket-compatible instruments such as the total 
pricing and certification of nature, while cer-
tainly applying market instruments for politi-
cally set, democratically developed goals and 
standards, in structural policy, and with stipu-
lations and bans, and to consistently work for 
social justice as the condition for ecological 
structural change. Green democratic socialism 
is a true alternative, to be imagined as a social 
and at the same time an ecological process of 
transformation. 
A central problem of a socio-ecological trans-
formation, which cannot be treated here in any 
detail, since it is beyond the scope of this pa-
per and also because it has not been ad-
dressed sufficiently to date, is the necessary 
abandonment of the hitherto prevailing growth 
model in the industrialised countries, and the 
transition to sustainable development 
(Binswanger, 2006; Bischoff et al., 2006; Falk-
inger, 1986; Reuter, 2000; Zinn, 2002; Zinn, 
2008). Prevailing politics, which corresponds 
to the logic of capital, but also the concept of 
green capitalism, depend on a renewal of 
growth as a decisive means for solving prob-
lems. The left, especially the trade unions, 
have throughout their history always seen 
economic growth as the best possible condi-
tion for the struggle for the redistribution of 
wealth in their favour. State socialism was to 
defeat capitalism through higher growth. But 
growth, which in its capitalist guise has pro-
duced a level of wealth never before known, 
has become an existential threat of our natural 
conditions of life. 
Growth is destroying the biosphere. By 2050, 
the consumption of fossil energy resources 
and other important raw materials will have to 
be reduced at least to 20 per cent of the level 
of 1990. Even given annual zero growth, this 
would require a fivefold increase in the pro-
ductivity or efficiency of materials. At one per 
cent economic growth, such an increase 
would require an eightfold rise in material pro-
ductivity, a two per cent growth level, a thir-
teen-fold increase, a 2.5 per cent level, a sev-
enteen-fold increase, and the three per cent 
growth rate which McKinsey has set as the 
target for Germany, a twenty-two-percent in-
crease. If, in view of climate change proceed-
ing at a faster pace than had been assumed 
until recently, a reduction in the consumption 
of fossil energy resources and other basic re-
sources to 10 per cent in the industrial coun-
tries were to become indispensable, a thirty-
four-fold increase in material efficiency by 
2050 would be needed (Witt 1998; Rosa Lux-
emburg Foundation [ed.] 2000: 124). This 
however seems impossible, despite all innova-
tions in environmental engineering. Growth 
eats up the relief provided by improvements in 
resource efficiency, unless the rate of increase 
in efficiency is considerably higher than the 
rate of economic growth – the so-called re-
bound effect. But improvement in material 
productivity is not endlessly possible, nor at 
any speed. There is an absolute limit to the 
decoupling of economic growth from resource 
consumption. Therefore, the Wuppertal Insti-
tute for Climate, Environment and Energy con-
cludes: ‚A society which wants to become 
future-capable will have to address the possi-
bility that it will itself, and certainly its future 
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generations, have to get by with less eco-
nomic growth – and ultimately with none at 
all.‛ (Wuppertal Institute, 2008: p. 112). An 
important aspect of the crossroads situation at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century is that 
of paths leading to destruction of the bio-
sphere by adherence to economic growth, or 
to sustainable development in the industrial 
countries without economic growth. 
No less important than an enormous push for 
the development of efficiency technologies will 
be a transition to sustainable development, 
which will require a drastic change in our ways 
of life. The material consumption of the better-
off strata will drop quantitatively in favour of 
higher quality of life for all through more and 
better education and culture, reduction in 
working hours and sensible use of leisure time, 
and human relations based on solidarity. 
Material restrictions for the majority of the 
population can be kept in limits by redistribu-
tion at the expense of the rich and the super-
rich, provided this can be achieved in the in-
tense distribution struggles to be expected. 
Given a continuation of the present weakness 
of the wage-earning strata, the present ten-
dencies toward growth stagnation will, to a 
great degree, be at their expense. 
The depth of the cuts for consumers can also – 
again, provided the appropriate struggles are 
waged – be greatly limited by ensuring that 
losses in wealth and forms of economic 
growth which for most people presently mean 
loss of prosperity, can be overcome. These 
include heavy losses in already created wealth 
through wars, environmental destruction and 
diseases, but also the fact that wealth is pro-
duced and moved in forms which for most 
people mean a deduction from what they 
really need, such as investments of billions in 
financial products and advertising, arms pro-
duction, the turnover of hundreds of billions in 
the area of organised professional crime, petty 
crime and corruption, and losses due to the 
normal course of things in our throw-away 
society (Klein, 2006). 
A future sustainable society of solidarity in the 
industrial countries will open up environmental 
space for the emerging and developing coun-
tries on a new development path beyond the 
growth society, and thus at the same time 
provide them with an alternative so as not to 
have to follow in the footsteps of the West, at 
least not to the bitter end. 
This transition from traditional growth to sus-
tainable development will mean very deep cuts 
in the way of life of each of us, it will mean 
breaks with values and everyday life patterns 
which have been internalised for centuries, it 
will demand cultural breaks, and time which is 
actually no longer available. This transition will 
lend democratic socialism a character which 
the mothers and fathers of socialist visions 
could not yet suspect, and which must first be 
discovered. 
The profit and market mechanisms cannot 
produce any unity of freedom and equality. 
They produce the opposite of solidarity, de-
stroying the natural conditions for the repro-
duction of society. The failure of the market 
will therefore have to be answered by a central 
positioning of the public sphere in a Second 
Great Transformation. Only thus can the mil-
lennial tasks of the twenty-first century be-
come solvable: the overcoming of wars, hun-
ger and misery in the world, of illiteracy and 
status-based education, of deficiency diseases, 
and of unjust access to environmental space 
and societal decision-making. This means: 
THIRD: 
In the transformation to a future-oriented soci-
ety, the public sphere - public goods, public 
support of livelihood, public ownership, public 
and publicly funded employment, public 
spaces and participation in the public decision-
making process – will become the conditio 
sine qua non for individual freedom. It will be-
come the medium of solidarity, because it will 
be able to provide fair access to the elemen-
tary conditions of life, and to such freedom 
goods as education, health and mobility. The 
public sphere will become the support of the 
individual against a future of uncertainty and 
exclusion. Ultimately, the public sphere in-
cludes the protection of global public goods: 
the stability of the biosphere and particularly 
climate stability, of peace and of human secu-
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rity against poverty, hunger, and treatable dis-
ease. 
The left project of a transformation to a just 
society therefore requires the recovery, 
strengthening and formation of the public 
sphere as a bracket between the individuals in 
society, between the I and the We. Whoever 
wants individual self-determination, must want 
the expansion and formation of the public 
sphere. The neo-liberal project is the individu-
alisation of everyone against everyone. The 
project of the left is the individuality of every-
one through participation in the public sphere 
by all. The politics of privatisation, supported 
by all Bundestag parties other than the LEFT 
PARTY, excludes a central position for the 
public sphere in their programmatic and politi-
cal practice. 
Both the first-rate significance of the provision 
of freedom goods for all, and especially the 
urgent expansion of public livelihood support 
indicate that emancipatory alternatives involve 
profound socio-ecological structural upheavals 
in society: for example, changes in relative 
shares of general provisions for reproduction, 
such as education, health, child care, care for 
the elderly and the health-impaired, culture, 
social security systems, and mobility – and, in 
individual consumption, between the produc-
tion sector and the service sector; a radical 
shift away from fossil fuels to solar power; ar-
maments conversion; a transition to ecologi-
cally compatible ways of life; and a restructur-
ing of the relationship between domestic and 
export markets, and between domestic con-
sumption and solidarity support for developing 
countries. Therefore, the plan of the LEFT 
PARTY, put forward in their Bundestag elec-
tion platform for 2009, to implement a public 
investment programme of €100 billion annu-
ally as a financial foundation for societal struc-
tural policy, and a €100 million ‚future fund‛ 
for socio-ecological projects, would be an im-
portant instrument for public regulation, in 
place of market radicalism. 
FOURTH: 
The intellectual-political work of the left for an 
emancipatory transformation process has its 
point of reference not in the mere intellectual 
design of a Brave New World. To be a leftist 
means being there when projects for a better 
life are being built. That means working to 
mobilise alternative actors by participating 
oneself in their commitment, and networking 
them into movements, alliances and coalitions 
powerful enough to effect change in the 
struggle for a better future. Invocations of a 
better world alone will not suffice. Certainly, 
the effective presentation in the media of pic-
tures of a just society of solidarity can contrib-
ute to changing people’s thinking and their 
behaviour. If however such pictures suggest, 
as the Global Scenario Group, close to the 
Stockholm Environment Institute, has done in 
their study Great Transition (Global Scenario 
Group, 2003: 14), that the necessary change is 
already in full swing and that those but re-
cently responsible for the crises are already 
busy mutating into earth-rescuers, they then 
also contain tendencies which serve to block 
the necessary transformation processes. 
An intermediate summing up of the contents 
of a Second Great Transformation can be for-
mulated as follows: The substance of the First 
Great Transformation described by Karl Polanyi 
was the transition from feudalism to the capi-
talist commodity society, and the full devel-
opment of bourgeois capitalist societies. The 
substance of a Second Great Transformation 
will be the transition to a society which over-
comes the basic structural deficits of capital-
ism, and is therefore oriented towards justice, 
solidarity and sustainability. Here, such a soci-
ety has been called ‚democratic socialism‛. It 
is described as a composite of: 
 freedom through equality and solidarity 
 socio-ecological reconstruction 
 defence and expansion of the public 
sphere 
 mobilisation of protagonists for a just soci-
ety. 
At the end of the seventies, Jean François Lyo-
tard had proclaimed ‚the end of the great sto-
ries‛ as a feature of postmodernism. That, 
however, did not prevent neo-liberalism from 
continuing its story of the solution to the 
world’s problems through the unleashing of 
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markets. Today, leftist alternatives are crop-
ping up with a many-voiced concert of points 
of view and approaches. The challenge to the 
socialist left is to pick up its own great story of 
socialism, which was thoroughly discredited 
by the reality of state socialism, and continue it 
as the story of a democratic and libertarian 
socialism rebuilt from the ground up, in such a 
way that links to other progressive stories and 
alliances and those who embody them, can be 
established. This is all the more urgent inas-
much as it is not at all certain that the neo-
liberal story will not survive the present crisis. 
However, it is certainly possible – many say 
probable – that it will lose its hegemonic posi-
tion as an ideology. 
The story of the left answers the simple ques-
tion: ‚What do people need so as to be able to 
live in a self-determined manner?‛ (The 
LEFT/PDS, 2005: ff.). This question determines 
the consistent theme running through the pro-
grammatic structure of the left. This question 
could become a permanent fixture in the pub-
lic appearance of the left – along with the an-
swers to it. 
Democratic socialism – provided it is able, as it 
has yet to demonstrate, to actually convey the 
multilayered emancipatory content of this con-
cept! – certainly has what it takes to concep-
tually formulate a conclusive societal alterna-
tive to capitalism and to become the content 
of a Second Great Transformation. 
THE SECOND GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION: A 
PROCESS 
The different society of the future has in the 
history of the left been foreseen either as a 
process of growing into the new society by 
way of reforms, as one of the moralisation and 
the humanisation of capitalism, or as the result 
of a great act of revolution. An understanding 
of democratic socialism as a transformative 
process means the Aufhebung of both ap-
proaches into a left theory of transformation 
and its realisation in a practice a dialectical 
intertwining of reformist and revolutionary 
changes. 
Generations of social-democratic reformers 
have worked on the theoretical foundations of 
paths to reform. They have viewed bourgeois 
capitalist societies as basically formable in a 
democratic and social direction to an unlimited 
degree. They were able, by means of reforms, 
to win political liberties, considerable im-
provements for wage workers and welfare-
state security systems, without calling the 
dominance of profit or the underlying issues of 
the ownership of property into question. But 
they have not been able to prevent the polari-
sation between rich and poor, the exploitation 
of large parts of the earth’s population, devas-
tating crises, wars, or the acute endangerment 
of the biosphere. 
Generations of communists oriented them-
selves towards a revolution theory in which 
they viewed western societies as reduced to 
their basic capitalist structure. Their potential 
for evolution was denied under communist 
orthodoxy, and greater improvements ex-
pected only beyond the Rubicon of revolution. 
In the west, this led them into isolation. The 
communist revolutions of the twentieth cen-
tury replaced capitalist oppression with mo-
nopolistic party structures, brought greater 
social equality, broad popular education and 
progress in gender equality, but radically lim-
ited individual freedom, destroyed the envi-
ronment even more than capitalism was do-
ing, and, with their centralist economic regula-
tion, so restricted innovation that state social-
ism in Europe ultimately failed economically, 
too. 
In the history of the left, reformists and revolu-
tionaries have always fought each other and 
have thus weakened the left. They saw reform 
and revolution as mutually antagonistic, and 
generally saw them as devoid of any linkage. A 
left theory of transformation will leave such 
antinomic thinking behind it. 
FIRST, 
it is characteristic of emancipatory transforma-
tion processes that they can combine reforms 
with upheavals of revolutionary depth. The 
strength of reformism is that it makes change 
possible via a long series of many practicable 
partial reforms. It is the weakness of reform-
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ism that it shrinks back before changing capi-
talism’s basic structures, or its conditions of 
property and power. The attainable change 
therefore remains limited, due to the fact that 
the dominance of profit has hardly been chal-
lenged. 
The strength of revolutionary concepts is that 
they aim at the transgression of the bounda-
ries of capitalism, and consistently press for 
the necessary changes. Their weakness is that 
they place little value on the reforms possible 
within bourgeois capitalist societies, and see 
them as at best instruments for leading the 
masses toward the hoped-for revolution. 
A left theory of transformation is able to over-
come the weaknesses of both concepts of so-
cietal renewal, and to incorporate their 
strengths in itself. Reform and revolution do 
not exclude each other categorically. Revolu-
tionary change can come about in the form of 
sudden breaks, but even in such cases, it at 
the same time includes a wide variety of re-
form steps, in which only some of the changes 
are deep breaks. Reforms, the totality of which 
under the preconditions of continual changes 
in the relationship of forces in favour of more 
far-reaching demands, ultimately amounts at 
the bottom line to profound revolutionary 
change, are not the total counter-pole to such 
change. 
A just, sustainable, peaceful society based on 
solidarity, which can be described as democ-
ratic socialism, is not only to be expected as a 
future societal structure in the great beyond of 
present conditions, but must rather also be 
seen as a goal and also as a development, the 
elements of which can already take shape to-
day, and which can already be of orienting 
significance for present alternative action. 
SECOND: 
Thus can democratic socialism become a mat-
ter of this world, for all those who expect of 
left politics improvements in their present 
working and daily lives – today, not some day, 
and long before capitalism calls it quits. At the 
same time however, transformation means 
opening up presently practicable reforms to 
steps leading beyond capitalism. Transforma-
tion means incorporating hope and a vision 
into what is feasible today. It overcomes the 
self-restraint to the next steps, without dissolv-
ing them in illusions. A transformation strategy 
can prove to be more capable of mobilisation 
than single ideas for reform which offer no 
perspective, or than a utopia which fails to 
change the here-and-now. 
THIRDLY, 
a transformation process opens up the oppor-
tunity of being better able to overcome deep-
rooted delimitations of different leftists against 
each other. The concentration of one group, 
the ‚revolutionists‛ upon protest and resis-
tance to the existing system and propagation 
of a future socialist order, and of the other, the 
‚pragmatists‛, on presently practicable partial 
steps, can become conceivable as different 
contributions to a uniform overall process, be-
tween the exponents of which bridges can be 
built, because what is at issue is the contradic-
tory moments of one and the same process. 
The potentials for change of extra-
parliamentary struggles, parliamentary work 
and work in government gain greater strength 
through the conscious linkage to an emancipa-
tory transformation process than through a 
delimitation of their protagonists and strate-
gies from one another. Viewed reformistically 
or revolutionistically, reforms within capitalism 
and upheavals which go beyond it appear in-
sulated against one another. Viewed transfor-
mationally, on the other hand, and acted upon 
accordingly, both developments can be 
shaped as a uniform process with many transi-
tions. 
FOURTHLY, 
the attitude opens up the possibility of broad 
alliances in a presumably long process of 
transformation. In periods in which a com-
pletely different society cannot in any case be 
the task as yet, alliances for partial goals can 
be concluded in which radical protagonists 
cooperate with moderate forces whose goal is 
nothing more than a better capitalism. In such 
phases, even alliances of the majority with 
strategically thinking factions of the power 
elites are possible in order to prevent global 
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dangers to humankind, even if the latter see 
the possible partial steps towards social or 
ecological change primarily as an opportunity 
to safeguard their power. 
THE SECOND GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION: ALLIANCES 
AND DEMOCRACY 
The alliances which the grass roots of an 
emancipatory transformation process can 
build are determined by its contents and its 
character. The reforms in the phase of welfare-
state regulated capitalism, which Ralf Dahren-
dorf described as the age of social democracy, 
were supported by a middle-top alliance. The 
classic social-democratic reforms were imple-
mented by governments from the top down – 
whether recruited from the social-democratic 
parties, from President Roosevelt’s Democratic 
Party in the USA, or in some countries, under 
the pressure of circumstances, even from con-
servative parties – together with the broad 
middle strata of society, particularly male 
skilled worker and their trade unions. Women, 
predominantly dependent on the male family 
breadwinner, were generally assigned a rather 
passive role. The lower strata were rather paci-
fied by social security systems, more than be-
ing active allies. This social base of social-
democratic reform politics explains both its 
considerable successes over the course of 
several decades, and also its limitations. 
Future transformation processes will have a 
different social base. Their opportunity is a 
middle-bottom alliance based on democracy 
and solidarity. Michael Brie has, based on the 
study by Rita Müller-Hilmer for the Social-
Democratic Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Gesell-
schaft im Reformprozess [Society in a process 
of reform] (Müller Hilmer, 2006), and on Gero 
Neugebauer’s work Politische Milieus in Deut-
schland [political identity groups in Germany] 
(Neugebauer, 2007), determined that of the 
political identity groups investigated there, 
which were compiled to six for the sake of 
simplicity, at least three large groupings could 
enter into an alliance of interest groups for a 
transformation to a sustainable society of soli-
darity: the social-libertarian middle class, the 
threatened core staff in corporations, and the 
sub-proletarian groups, or the ‚modern pre-
cariat‛ (Brie, 2007: 13 -45; Institute for Social 
Analysis 2/2009: 10 ff). The possibility for a 
broad historical block uniting these political 
identity groups and other forces emerges from 
the fact that the desirable characteristics of a 
just society of solidarity as outlined in Section 
3, as the contents of an emancipatory trans-
formation, correspond to the interests of thor-
oughly different social groups of the majority 
of the population. But this will merely be a 
possibility, as long as the left is not able to 
present its transformational ideas as an attrac-
tive societal project for the entire spectrum of 
potential actors, which provides solutions for 
the urgent problems of the present and at the 
same time longer-term perspectives for live-
able lives. But even if this were to succeed – 
and many initiatives for such a project do al-
ready exist – this would not yet suffice to win 
majorities for the decision to actively support 
such a transformation project. Two things 
would be necessary in addition: that the left 
and other democratic exponents of a society 
of solidarity at least potentially recognise the 
power to actually succeed in implementing 
such a project, and that they be seen as pos-
sessing the expertise and the skills needed to 
carry it out. At present, neither applies to the 
left in Germany, or in Europe. The left in 
Europe is at present not an actor capable of 
hegemony, unlike the situation in a number of 
Latin American countries. 
Work on building a broad middle-bottom alli-
ance is thus a central task for all left forces, so 
as to enable the entry into a Second Great 
Transformation. This will require: 
 ‚A long (or ever?) unknown willingness for 
cooperation and communication not only 
between these tendencies (within the left, 
D.K.), but also between everything in 
which they differentiate themselves: 
spaces and options for action, modes of re-
flection, strategies to be played out nation-
ally and internationally, strategic alliances, 
political concepts and possible alternative 
projects.‛ (Seibert, 2009: 7). 
 Considerable strengthening of the skills of 
alternative actors in a wide variety of politi-
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cal areas, their application in concrete pro-
jects for the solution of burning questions 
in the interest of the lower strata and the 
middle of society, and thus ‚to shift every-
day practices‛ leftwards (Brand, 2009: 43). 
 Providing the concrete struggles with a 
common direction, determined by an at-
tractive left societal project as an alterna-
tive to capitalism. For: ‚we must be able to 
imagine an alternative, if we want to 
change anything‛ (Ceceña, 2009: 20). 
A democratic renewal will succeed in a second 
great transformation only as a process carried 
of the majority, or not at all. 
THE SECOND GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION: THE TIME 
WINDOW PROBLEM 
A future transformation which already initiates 
a change towards solidarity under the given 
conditions of bourgeois capitalism, but which, 
according to the expectations of large portions 
of the left, is to lead to overcoming the domi-
nance of profit in society, contains a deep con-
tradiction. Such a transformation will pre-
sumably be a long process of searching and 
learning, in the course of continual struggles 
of contending classes and social groups. But 
in contradiction to this long-term horizon, very 
far-reaching steps for the prevention of a cli-
mate catastrophe, of other environmental haz-
ards, and of the death of many millions of 
people from hunger, deficiency diseases, de-
struction of the environment and wars in the 
poor countries, are of the utmost urgency. Ac-
cording to the conviction of a large majority of 
climatologists, humankind has only a short 
time window of a decade or a decade and a 
half to just barely ward off the tipping of cli-
mate change into a climate catastrophe with 
far-reaching changes – albeit even so with very 
severe damage. The power of the present rul-
ers will not be broken during this period, nor 
will the profit system which is destroying the 
environment be overcome. 
Is it conceivable that a change in the relation-
ship between society and nature, which could 
save the stability of the climate, and which is 
not possible without considerable change in 
the conditions within society itself, could, as 
an the essential part of a coming transforma-
tion, proceed more rapidly than the presum-
able emergence of a democratic, socialist so-
ciety? Will it be possible, in the fight against 
the destructive policy of the rulers, to force 
policy changes and compromises from far-
sighted and responsible parts of the power 
elites that could lead to such solutions to hu-
mankind’s problems as a solar energy revolu-
tion and a policy climate turnaround, or the 
abolition of all nuclear weapons? 
Not a few leftists reject the idea of such cross-
class survival pacts as unrealistic. As Susan 
George wrote: ‚A further illusion is to assume 
that corporations and rich countries will at 
least change their behaviour when they see 
they are demolishing the life of the planet on 
which we all have to live. This is perhaps the 
most pernicious of all fallacies because it 
would seem so clearly in the interests of eve-
ryone, including elites, to preserve our eco-
logical base. Personally, I don't think they can 
stop even if they want to, even for their own 
children. Capitalism is like that famous bicycle 
that has to keep moving forward or topple 
over — and corporations are all competing to 
see who can pedal fastest, straight into the 
brick wall.‛2 But the question is, whether this 
may not be an overly economistic view, 
whether the political relationship of forces 
cannot be considerably modified by change in 
the mode of action and the intensity of effect 
of economic laws, and by a change of cultural 
views and of the legal framework. 
Like Susan George, Neil Smith (Smith, 2008), 
Paul Burkett (Burkett, 2006), Victor Wallis 
(Wallis, 2008), Tadzio Müller and Stefan Kauf-
mann (Müller/Kaufmann, 2009), Harald Welzer 
(Welzer, 2008) and Elmar Altvater (Altvater, 
2009) similarly exclude the opening of the gate 
to ecological sustainability by a turn to green 
capitalism. ‚The ‘moderates’ have, with their 
obstinate attempts to elicit an ecological rem-
edy from a system that obsessively tramples 
down everything in its path, lost all sense of 
realism.‛ (Wallis, 2008: 882). Other leftists who 
embed the indispensable criticism of the con-
                                               
2 http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj91/george.htm 
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cept of green capitalism in a transformational-
theoretical approach, contradict such exclu-
sively antagonistic thinking (Wolf, 2009, 2009; 
Klein, 2009). There are many good reasons not 
to see green capitalism as the solution to the 
environmental crisis. But this is only half the 
truth. For according to all historical experience, 
the mobile boundaries of capitalism always 
include considerable potentials for adaptation 
and play within them. The possibility that par-
tial successes could result in the ecologisation 
of the economy and society, even under con-
ditions of capitalism, cannot be ruled out. The 
left should use this space of possibility to enter 
upon a socio-ecological reconstruction of so-
ciety. Instead of assuming the role of objectors 
by denying capitalism any potential for 
stronger environmental orientation, it should 
recognise the differences within the ruling 
block and put on public pressure for the fulfil-
ment of many promises made by the rulers for 
sustainable development. Socio-ecological 
reconstruction should, for the left, constitute a 
key aspect of a Second Great Transformation. 
A Green New Deal certainly could be initiated 
in the context of tension between a green 
capitalism supported primarily by sections of 
the power elites conscious of the looming 
dangers, and the contradictions and limits just 
indicated. It could, in the context of changes in 
the societal relation of forces, increasingly lead 
in a socio-ecological reconstruction, which, 
under pressure from the forces of counter-
power, would be carried out on the basis of 
democracy and solidarity. The Green New Deal 
itself would have to be understood as a proc-
ess, the social content and environmentally 
effective scope of which would be changing. 
Are there historical parallels which argue for 
the possibility of cross-class alliances in ques-
tions of human survival, or for strategic politi-
cal action of parts of the power elites them-
selves against basic tendencies of the profit 
mechanism? 
The development of the New Deal in the USA 
during the thirties can only in part be seen as a 
parallel. It was not about a global problem of 
humankind, it was about maintaining the capi-
talist system after the deep shock of the world 
economic crisis of 1929-’32; it was about a 
‚practical reaction, carried out from above, to 
the failure of the ruling class of America‛ 
(Carlson/Unger, 1992: 34, 29 ff.), implemented 
by the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
The New Deal was not a strategy planned 
from the start. It was forced by a deep sys-
temic crisis, by a delegitimisation of big busi-
ness, and by the electoral defeat of the Repub-
licans, who had ruled up to that time. It arose 
out of a movement for the self-organisation of 
the workers, influenced by the upswing of so-
cial reformist ideas and strongly characterised 
by left-liberal, previously largely disinterested 
intellectuals and artists. A section of the ruling 
class saw itself forced against its will – and 
against the bitter resistance of the conserva-
tive majority of the power elite – to gradually 
implement a package of reforms which ulti-
mately ended up as a Fordistic distribution 
compromise. But this development was only 
consolidated when, in view of the rise of Hit-
ler’s fascism and of the looming World War, 
massive armaments programmes led the 
economy out of the continuing depression. 
Yet we can ascertain: there was a crisis which 
threatened the power structure, public con-
sciousness was moving to the left, there was 
pressure from of the masses who were pro-
foundly insecure, and intellectuals were in-
volved in a democratic movement, all of which 
was able to move a minority of the power elite, 
in the teeth of opposition from the majority of 
the ruling class, to implement the greatest 
break in American history, in terms of the po-
litical role of the state and its social responsi-
bility. 
The fact that after the Second World War, the 
experiences of the New Deal and the welfare-
state path of Scandinavian countries for dec-
ades fed into the structure of welfare-state 
regulated capitalism on the OECD scale was 
due to the historically special growth condi-
tions, and also to outside pressure in the East-
West conflict of systems. 
Today, most of these concrete, historical con-
ditions of the New Deal are not present. The 
ruling class did not by any means, in the man-
agement of the present crisis, fail as sensa-
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tionally as it did in 1929-‘32 (Van der Pijl, 2009: 
29 ff). It has been able to prevent a collapse of 
employment such as occurred during the De-
pression, as well as a total collapse of the fi-
nancial system and the flight into protection-
ism. The recent crisis has not been heightened 
to the point of a political power crisis. Unlike 
the crisis of 1929-’32, the trade unions have 
not gained in fighting strength; rather, they 
have been weakened. At present, it is not the 
democrats or the social democrats in Europe, 
but the conservatives who are on the rise. But 
they have learned, as the coalition of the con-
servative CDU/CSU and the liberal FDP in 
Germany shows, to channel the pressure from 
below by means of moderate socio-political 
concessions. Roosevelt’s New Deal only 
worked because it was supported by drastic 
institutional change: the state’s power to inter-
vene in the market was strengthened to a far 
higher degree than is the case today, espe-
cially once the war economy was instituted. 
The trade unions were broadly included in ad-
ministrative regulatory institutions at that time. 
At present, no such conditions prevail. Unlike 
during the post-war period, we have today no 
particularly favourable growth conditions, and 
certainly no pressure from any powerful 
counter-force, such as the Soviet Union was at 
that time. 
But it is not the strength of the conservative 
forces, but primarily the weakness of the left 
that is characteristic of the situation in Europe 
today. This can change. In the USA, the an-
nounced programme of Barack Obama is cer-
tainly reminiscent of the project of the New 
Deal – without being able to be based on a 
militant working class, however. Although the 
implosion of state socialism has freed the 
western power elites from outside pressure to 
act, it has also deprived them of the glue of 
internal cohesion with reference to an external 
threat. The economic space to be able to meet 
full-blown challenges is substantially greater 
today than it was during the crisis of 1929-‘32. 
The differences relative to the era of Roose-
velt’s New Deal are thus ambivalent, and need 
not argue conclusively against the ability of the 
power elites today to learn lessons, compared 
with what pertained at that time. 
An additional experience regarding the ability 
of sections of the power elites to learn under 
shock is shown by their behaviour during the 
Second World War, and during the phase of 
‚new thinking‛, arms control and disarma-
ment towards the end of the Cold War. The 
military expansion of Germany and the threat 
to bourgeois civilisation posed by fascism led 
to an alliance of the western powers with the 
hated Soviet Union. Their long delay in open-
ing a second front in the West against Hitler’s 
Germany reflects the reluctance of powerful 
sections of the ruling elite with regard to that 
alliance. Eric Hobsbawm wrote about this coa-
lition which bridged classes and ideologies: 
‚And, as it turned out, the crucial lines in this 
[international – D.K.] civil war were not drawn 
between capitalism as such and communist 
social revolution, but between ideological 
families: on the one hand the descendants of 
the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the 
great revolutions including, obviously, the 
Russian Revolution; on the other, its oppo-
nents. In short, the frontier ran not between 
capitalism and communism, but between 
what the nineteenth century would have called 
‘progress’ and ‘reaction’ — only that these 
terms were no longer quite apposite.‛ (Hobs-
bawm, 1994: The Age of Extremes, p. 144.) 
During the war, the USA very rapidly – under 
state control and with the cooperation of the 
trade unions – accomplished the conversion of 
large parts of the civilian economy to arms 
production. In the context of the Manhattan 
Project for the production of the American 
atomic bomb, the work of more than a hun-
dred thousand people in hundreds of scientific 
facilities and production centres was coordi-
nated across all boundaries of competition. 
Lester R. Brown concluded: ‚This mobilisation 
of resources within a matter of months dem-
onstrates that a country and, indeed, the world 
can restructure the economy quickly if con-
vinced of the need to do so.‛ (Brown, 2008: 
280). 
When after the Second World War the military 
and particularly the nuclear potentials of the 
opponents in the Cold War did ensure a bal-
ance of terror, but at the same time threatened 
the existence of large portions of humankind 
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and thus also endangered the power the rulers 
of the world, the long-term survival interests, 
too, of parts of the ruling class finally won out 
over aggressiveness of the hawks and the in-
terests of the military-industrial complex. It 
proved possible to implement the concept of 
mutual security in arms control treaties and 
disarmament agreements. 
We can thus ascertain: If the power of the el-
ites and of human civilisation are threatened, 
realistic sectors of these elites are capable of 
far-reaching political redirection of the econ-
omy and also of making arrangements even 
with their most terrible opponents – if only the 
profit system can thus be upheld. 
For the strategy of the left, including the LEFT 
PARTY, this is of very great significance. There 
is a considerable difference between having on 
the one hand to assume that warding off the 
climate catastrophe, accelerated species ex-
tinction or other environmental crises can be 
successful only in a post-capitalist society – 
i.e., after major catastrophes – or on the other, 
that a considerable change in the societal rela-
tionship of forces, a transition from the neo-
liberal developmental stage of capitalism to a 
post-neo-liberal phase of green capitalism can 
be implemented. In the second case, the 
chances are greater for initiating the necessary 
socio-ecological reorganisation, because pro-
gress can also be supported by sections of the 
power elite. 
A comparison of the threat also to the western 
power elites from the fascist war of aggression 
and later from the threat of nuclear war, with 
the danger posed by a climate catastrophe, the 
results of decimated biodiversity and contin-
ued poverty in large regions of the world, 
would however have to take a considerable 
difference into account: The dangers today are 
more a creeping threat, not so much an im-
mediate and visible one, as they were at that 
time. They are much easier to repress. At least 
the environmental threats are not the work of 
hostile powers; rather, they operate more or 
less invisibly. This makes a learning process in 
the power elites under shock, as in 1929-‘32, 
in the Second World War, or under the impact 
of a strategic nuclear balance of terror more 
improbable. However, the great dangers of the 
twenty-first century are actually greater than 
those of the twentieth century, even for the 
rulers. Moreover, climate change will increase 
in seriousness very rapidly. The costs of the 
necessary reactions to it will be all the higher 
the longer climate policy change fails to be 
implemented. The disruption of the ecological 
balance will be a particularly heavy burden 
upon the people in the poor countries of the 
world, and could lead to very intense reac-
tions. The oil price increases to be expected 
also hit them particularly hard. That could en-
hance state failure in large regions of the world 
and give international terrorism new impetus. 
In any case, the interweaving of various proc-
esses of crisis and instability will continue. The 
possible modified reproduction of neo-liberal 
capitalism and a renewed financial crisis could 
lead to a shock situation, even for the ruling 
elites. 
In view of a renaissance of a bourgeois hu-
manist sense of responsibility as outlined 
above, the possibility within the context of an 
only very brief historical time window, of 
pressing mobile factions of the power elites to 
take decisive steps to stabilise the climate and 
reduce other major threats cannot be ruled 
out. However, the present relation of forces 
gives cause for justifiable doubt about it. 
If however responsible circles in the ruling 
class can win out, such a development could 
be seen by the LEFT PARTY as part of a trans-
formational process, and create an Aufhebung, 
to the extent possible within capitalism, to-
wards a further-reaching perspective of new 
societal relations with nature. Thus, a Green 
New Deal would be a process of socio-
ecological reconstruction which would start in 
the post-neo-liberal phase of a partially 
greened capitalism, and would be continued 
more perfectly in a post-capitalist development 
– constituting a central characteristic of eman-
cipatory alternatives, or of democratic social-
ism. For a considerable time, however, the 
success of such a process would depend on a 
combination of powerful pressure from below 
and ecological change from above. Due to the 
profit mechanism, it must be expected that a 
green capitalism, inasmuch as it would be 
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pushed by parts of the power elites, would be 
implemented very much at the expense of the 
waged strata, the underprivileged and the ma-
jority in the world’s non-competitive countries, 
and would moreover be oriented towards a 
growth which would threaten to eat up eco-
logical advances again. Precisely for that rea-
son, a block of democratic socio-ecological 
counter-forces working to drive the develop-
ment beyond green capitalism will be needed. 
In this contradiction-filled sense, a capitalism 
potentially capable – albeit to a limited degree 
– of a green reconstruction can be expected, 
as a historical parallel to the capitalism of the 
1980s, which was capable of mutual security, 
arms control and disarmament. The conditions 
for that are that the struggle of counter-forces 
for democratic socio-ecological change, de-
velopment and peace, while not powerful 
enough to force an end to capitalism in the 
foreseeable future, will be strong enough to 
make use of clashes of interests and elements 
of ecological reason in the power elites, and to 
force them to implement urgent changes in 
environmental, energy and climate policy. 
Success is possible if the pressure of the dan-
gers is great enough to force both sides to 
change their behaviour, and if the conflicts 
within the ruling block are decided in favour of 
the more flexible forces, which are more open 
to global responsibility. 
The LEFT PARTY must draw conclusions from 
such strategic considerations in its program-
matic structure and its politics, which fit into a 
transformation strategy. That must include 
politics for building a middle-bottom alliance 
which, in global questions affecting human-
kind, can go as far as joint action, albeit 
fraught with contradictions, with parts of the 
power elites. 
THE SECOND GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONCRETE 
POLITICS 
Considerations of transformation theory are 
not merely of programmatic significance. 
However, they have generally not even been 
dealt with in the programmes of leftist parties. 
The programmatic approaches of the Euro-
pean Left Party are amongst the exceptions. 
However, the transformation strategy also has 
significance for strategic and practical political 
action, beyond the programmatic structure of 
the left. Examples include: 
 Implications for the positioning of the left 
in the debate over CO2 emissions certifi-
cates in climate policy, and with regard to 
such issues as the current Desertec pro-
ject; 
 left structural policy with regard to electric 
cars; 
 left conclusions for the consolidation of the 
financial system. 
Let us discuss these points briefly. 
CO2 EMISSIONS CERTIFICATES: 
In the debate over CO2 emissions certificates, 
the difference between the reform of capital-
ism and reforms as an element of transforma-
tional processes becomes very clearly visible. 
For those sections of the power elites sensi-
tised to environmental issues, the introduction 
of emissions trading with CO2 certificates is 
the market-compatible main path towards re-
duction of carbon dioxide pollution and in-
creased global warming, since it leads to en-
ergy price increases and hence to a reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions. Left critics reject 
the use of this instrument because artificially 
designed rights to pollute the environment 
expand precisely the same market mechanism 
which has led us into the environmental disas-
ter in the first place (Altvater/ Brunnengräber, 
2008: 10 pp.). However, their legitimate criti-
cism would no longer be correct if emissions 
trading could be turned into an instrument of 
the socio-ecological transformation process. 
This would mean that in the context of ‚cap 
and trade‛ – capping total permissible emis-
sions while trading emissions certificates – 
absolute priority would have to be assigned to 
tough goals for mandatory reduction of emis-
sions through international treaties and na-
tional regulations. The primary allocation of 
emissions rights should be based on the prin-
ciple of the equal rights of all the earth’s in-
habitants to environmental space. This would 
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force the rich countries to purchase rights 
from the developing countries, and provide the 
latter with considerable funds for investment 
in climate protection. Moreover, the allocation 
should be accomplished by the auction of 
emissions rights, instead of free, as has been 
the case in the European Union to date. More-
over, financial compensation for the expected 
price increases should be guaranteed for the 
underprivileged segments of the population. 
Under such conditions, even the market in-
struments of a Green New Deal, in combina-
tion with regulatory, rather than market-
compatible instruments, and active preferential 
treatment for renewable energies, could be 
harnessed for a socio-ecological transforma-
tion. More important for alternative climate 
policy, however, than the use of market ele-
ments would be the political limitation of the 
supply of fossil fuel sources, which should be 
left in the ground; environmental stipulations 
and bans and the support for a decentralised 
energy industry; an energy saving lifestyle; and 
the societal control or socialisation of compa-
nies if their profit interests block sustainable 
climate policy. 
However, politics in the context of a transfor-
mation project would require not only that par-
tial social and ecological reforms within the 
context of capitalism be exhaustively used and 
opened up for further-reaching changes, but 
also that projects be resisted which set the 
course in a wrong direction and obstruct a 
sustainable future. A prime example of this is 
the Desertec project; another, the lopsided 
hopes being placed in electric cars as an envi-
ronmental solution for individual motorised 
traffic. 
THE DESERTEC PROJECT: 
The Desertec Industrial initiative, a consortium 
of initially twenty German and international 
corporations, was inaugurated on 13 July 
2009, with the goal of building solar power 
stations in the deserts of North Africa for a 
probably grossly underestimated capital ex-
penditure of €400 billion, to provide both elec-
tric power supplies to Africa and to cover 
about 15 per cent of European demand for elec-
tric power. Members of the consortium include 
the Deutsche Bank, which is to find and bring 
together investors to fund the project; Munich 
Re; the power companies RWE and Eon; Sie-
mens and Schott Solar; MAN Solar Millennium; 
the Swiss technology corporation ABB; the 
Spanish company Abengoa Solar; and the 
largest private corporation in Algeria, the Cevi-
tal Group. The project was welcomed em-
phatically by the media as ‚the greatest private 
eco-power initiative of all times‛ (Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 19 June 2009). Gerhard Knies, chair 
of the supervisory board of the Desertec 
Foundation, explained: ‚I would like to express 
my congratulations to industry, as saving the 
world may be the greatest ethical task and at 
the same time the biggest business deal of the 
future.‛ (Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 13, 2009). 
Greenpeace approves of the project, as do 
Chancellor Angela Merkel and opposition 
leader Sigmar Gabriel. 
But such a type of projects is precisely not the 
point of connection of leftists to corporate 
strategy and the politics of the rulers. Desertec 
means building an extreme version of a private 
power monopoly in a decisive field for the fu-
ture. Desertec stands for those contours of 
green capitalism which point in the wrong di-
rection. Energy supply in North Africa would 
be monopolised, instead of strengthening de-
velopment policy by means of a decentralised 
energy supply system. This power concentra-
tion would internationalise and cement mo-
nopoly pricing policy in the energy sector. The 
potentials of renewable energies for decen-
tralisation and communalisation, for local jobs, 
for democratic influence of citizens on their 
energy supply and local economic structures 
would be gambled away. Moreover, according 
to estimates by critical energy experts, the pro-
ject could become more expensive than a de-
centralised mix of various renewable energies. 
Hermann Scheer, president of Eurosolar and 
an Alternative Nobel Prize laureate, expects 
that by the time Desertec is able to deliver 
power – in 2020 at the earliest – decentralised 
solar and wind power in Germany will be 
cheaper than Desertec power. He wrote: ‚The 
corporations are pursuing the goal of prolong-
ing the structures of today’s energy supply 
into the age of renewable energies. Desertec 
means power from a single consortium, which 
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would control production plants and transmis-
sion lines alike.‛ (manager-magazin.de, 13 July 
2009) – at a time when even the EU Commis-
sion is forcing energy corporations to split up 
their grids. 
Desertec is an outstanding example for the 
fact that the narrowness of the climate and 
energy policy time window is a challenge to 
de-link strategic structural decisions from the 
extrapolation of the old destructive structures 
– now, not sometime in the future. Exactly the 
reverse is being done, however, with this cele-
brated desert power project. 
THE ELECTRIC CAR PROJECT: 
A second example for the reproduction of in-
appropriate structures in green guise is being 
heralded in the marketing campaign for elec-
tric cars. Apart from the fact that they would 
not be a particularly environmentally friendly 
solution if the energy they consume were pro-
vided by coal and oil-fired plants, they would 
also change very little in the existing mobility 
structure. Concentrating on them distracts 
from the development of public transport, re-
ducing overall traffic volumes and shifting it to 
the rails. Its use as a bare substitute for petrol-
run vehicles does not challenge existing urban 
structures: the consumption of public space as 
a space for the flow, congestion and the paid 
parking of the ubiquitous auto; the time-
consuming separation of home, work and cul-
ture; the uncontrolled urban sprawl into the 
landscape; and the elimination of the shops 
next door for the benefit of supermarkets in 
outlying areas. We would be confirming indi-
vidualistic mobility and lifestyles, while leaving 
traffic congestion unchanged. Prestige con-
sumerism can also come in an electrically 
powered version. The left should accept the 
advantages that electric cars provide with 
moderate individual use, as taxies, rental cars 
and in car-sharing fleets as a part of an overall 
ecological plan for modern mobility. But its 
abuse for the prolongation of individualistic, 
consumerist lifestyles and societal structures is 
not an acceptable perspective. ‚A hegemonic 
block of neo-liberal policy, dream factories, 
major corporations, trade unions and waged 
employees as well as the broad mass of work-
ers has emerged, for whom ‘cars are us’ 
seems to be the no-alternative model – materi-
ally and intellectually, rationally and emotion-
ally, economically and politically.‛ (Brie, 2009: 
169). 
Again, the challenge now is, within a narrow 
time window, to at least set the direction for a 
type of mobility that will preserve the envi-
ronment, as part of a non-consumerist society. 
The way there can be marked by a public pas-
senger transport system that is restful, pleas-
ant and, in future, free of charge, its connec-
tion points reachable within a few minutes 
from the points of departure; by reduced work-
ing hours, as compensation, too, for some-
times greater time spent for mobility; by a 
transition to urban structures based on short 
routes; by attractive local recreation possibili-
ties; by possibilities for self-realisation in edu-
cation, culture and sports instead of in high-
powered sedans; and by aesthetically de-
signed public spaces instead of streams of 
cars. The electric car, too, may have a place in 
such a picture. 
The point is that what is now feasible not block 
the path to the future, but that it be inserted 
into a broader transformational process from 
the point of view of left politics. This can be 
show, too, by way of left demands for the re-
newal of the financial system. 
RENEWING THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM: 
The left has presented a wide variety of con-
crete suggestions for overcoming the domi-
nance of the financial markets in the economy 
and society, for far-reaching restrictive meas-
ures on the banking system in the area of de-
posit banking, for the stable supply of the 
economy with loans, and for democratic con-
trol of the financial markets (Alternative Eco-
nomic Policy Working Group, 2009; Wahl: 
2009). The demands from the left spectrum 
include immediately necessary measures, such 
as the elimination of especially destabilising 
practices and instruments. These include a ban 
on credit securitisations, on credit default 
swaps, on off-market financial futures, and on 
short selling. They also include initiatives for a 
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repeal of the admittance of hedge funds in 
Germany, for a ban on operations with foreign 
hedge funds by German banks, and for the 
abolition of misplaced incentives for manager 
compensation. Other demands are aimed 
more towards a medium-term reform of the 
financial system, such as the roll-back and 
strict control of investment banking, stricter 
regulations for capital-based retirement plans, 
to keep them away from speculative opera-
tions, in the interest of the insured, for strict 
public supervision of private rating agencies 
and the establishment of public rating insti-
tutes, and for the introduction of transaction 
taxes on security and exchange transactions, 
deceleration of the financial markets, and re-
strictions of speculation (Bundestag-Printed 
Matter16/7191 / The LEFT PARTY). 
Thinking in terms of the transformation proc-
ess however, the present steps towards the 
stabilisation of the financial system would, ac-
cording to the concept of the LEFT PARTY, be 
planned as entry projects for the transforma-
tion of the private monopolistic financial sys-
tem dominated by short-term profit, to a public 
financial system dedicated to emancipatory 
goals and the socio-ecological reconstruction 
of society. This was expressed in the bill intro-
duced by the parliamentary group of the LEFT 
PARTY in the Bundestag on 29 January 2009: 
‚Socialise the big banks‛ (Printed Matter 
16/11747; Arenz 2009). 
For example, state participation in banks not 
should be constituted as silent partnerships, 
but should rather be tied to the prerequisite of 
mandatory public influence not of daily opera-
tions, but certainly of the direction of corporate 
policy. State participations in systemically im-
portant financial institutions should not be held 
only for as short a time as possible and then 
liquidated again, but should be used as an en-
try into growing public, democratic influence 
on the reorganisation of the financial system. 
Thus, nationalisations would lead to a process 
of socialisation: public bank ownership and 
public influence on control of the property of 
private banks, public monitoring, stipulations, 
bans and political policy directives should be 
combined in such a way that the transforma-
tion of the highly speculative financial system 
oriented toward shareholder value, to a bank-
ing system with the primary task of providing 
credit to manufacturing companies and espe-
cially to projects of socio-ecological recon-
struction could be initiated. 
A left transformation project would be de-
signed so as to be simultaneously social and 
ecological. In that way, leftists, trade unions 
and social movements intend to prevent the 
main burden of the financial crisis and other 
crises from being passed on to waged em-
ployees and underprivileged groups. Demands 
like that of the LEFT PARTY for a temporary 
millionaires’ tax of five per cent on private for-
tunes of €1 million or more have that in mind. 
The suggestion to impose a temporary special 
tax on managers of private financial institu-
tions of 80 per cent of annual incomes over 
€600,000 has the same thrust. That would en-
sure the national budget income which would 
counteract the temptation to master the esca-
lating national debt by further dismantling so-
cial expenditures. IG Metal (the German metal-
workers’ union) has proposed a public equity 
fund stocked with at least €100 billion, with 
which the state could buy shares in companies 
facing bankruptcy, with the goal of securing 
jobs, if necessary, through ecologically ori-
ented conversion. This fund would be financed 
by a forced loan of two per cent on private 
fortunes above €750,000. 
But at the same time, a determining public 
influence on the financial system to be restruc-
tured is urgent primarily because there must 
be an assurance that the tax money pumped 
into the banking system be invested for socio-
ecologically sensible economic development, 
instead of flowing into speculative financial 
investments once again, or fuelling inflation. 
An intermediate result: considerations of trans-
formation theory are not an abstract matter for 
programmatic debates detached from reality; 
rather they have orienting significance for 
strategies and concrete politics. 
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THE SECOND GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION: THE 
POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE 
LEFT 
An emancipatory transformation process 
based on a renewal of the democracy will nec-
essarily also includes a renewal of the political 
culture of the left. Even merely transcending 
the antagonistic confrontation between reform 
and revolution in the discourse of the left will 
require fundamentally overcoming the deeply 
rooted negative culture of mutual accusations, 
defamatory statements and exclusion. 
A transformational process of seeking and 
learning is completely incompatible with resid-
ual ideas on the left about being in possession 
of a monopoly on the truth about the future 
path and shape of society. Instead, a culture of 
argument will be necessary, of listening and 
checking arguments and counter-arguments, 
of toleration and of learning, too, from those 
who think differently. In the party-constituted 
left with a state-socialist history, this will re-
quire a complete break with Stalinist struc-
tures, such as the SED/PDS undertook at its 
founding party congress in 1989, when East 
Germany’s ruling SED added ‚democratic 
socialism‛ to its name and dropped its claim to 
sole power. The centralistic structure of state 
socialism, the narrowness of the intellectual 
framework of Marxist-Leninism, and the sanc-
tification of the party line suffocated all politi-
cal culture. ‚We said that it was better to be 
wrong with the party than to be right outside it 
and against it.‛ (Semprun, 1981: 82). The end 
of state socialism was therefore also a libera-
tion of culture in the broad sense, and particu-
larly of political culture. However, liberation 
from dogmatic thought structures and an open 
political culture remain a permanent task. They 
concern the entire left, and not at all only 
those parts of it with communist or state-
socialist origins. 
An open, communicative and cooperative po-
litical culture is also a requirement for commu-
nication between the very different political 
identity groups which could implement the 
emancipatory transformation process. These 
identity groups are distinguished to a large 
degree by their specific cultural habits, which 
are characteristic to their members. Again, 
toleration, considerable empathy, sensitive 
language and learning of differences will be 
required to make this community in diversity 
politically productive. This is all the more true 
of the political balancing act needed to keep 
step, in the struggle against the rulers, with 
the more farsighted and more flexible parts of 
the power elites who want to fight the climate 
catastrophe, bring a nuclear-free world closer, 
and ease poverty. In his book Rage and Time, 
the philosopher Peter Sloterdijk suggests the 
language of rage as the fundamental commu-
nications tool which moves development for-
ward. Without a doubt, such language is ap-
propriate for the purposes of accusation 
against attitudes and behaviours hostile to 
humanity. However, it is doubtful whether a 
pure language of rage can, without differentia-
tion, be the language of left political culture. It 
will hardly be able to reach that majority of 
citizens, who see opportunities for the design 
of their own lives in processes of individualisa-
tion, diversity of lifestyles, international division 
of labour and cultural encounter, progress in 
gender emancipation, self-responsibility and 
similar processes. And an exclusively aggres-
sive language will certainly build no bridges to 
those in the halls of power who are willing, 
against their own some short-term interests, to 
give the priority to reason in questions of hu-
man survival. 
Briefly, a future emancipatory transformation 
of society will require a new political culture of 
the left. People can change society if their 
concrete interests, their emotions and their 
intellect flow together to form a torrent up up-
heaval. Even if that does require collective pro-
tagonists, it also involves an inner decision by 
millions of individuals to take the renewal of 
society into their own hands. Rudolf Bahro 
formulated it briefly: ‚There will only be as 
much new direction as there are individuals 
who take a new direction.‛ (Bahro 1089: 464). 
Talcott Parsons saw as fundamental social 
change the result of a fundamental change in 
values in the cultural sphere of society, and the 
internalisation of this cultural change by indi-
viduals (Parsons, 1969). According to Günter 
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Anders, cultural changes must cause a politi-
cally relevant part of active people to acquire 
incomparably more depth of feeling and empa-
thy. Only thus might the ‚Promethean gap‛ 
between their power to transform, reminiscent 
of the bold energy of Prometheus, and the 
limitation of human capacity for responsibility 
for the consequences of their behaviour, be 
closed (Anders, 1985: 266). Douglass North has 
argued that the enormous difference in proc-
esses of change in societies shows that the 
cultural component, together with changes of 
institutions, is central, too, for a change in 
economics and politics over the course of time 
(North, 2005: IX). 
In the works quoted, there are repeated refer-
ences to drastic changes in the basic socio-
cultural situation of societies and individuals 
under the pressure of extreme tensions and 
dangers. In such cases, the cultural-intellectual 
constitution of a society can, for a historical 
moment, become decisive for great transfor-
mational progress. For the historian and re-
searcher of revolution Manfred Kossok, ‚an 
upheaval in philosophical thinking (as the core 
element of a general cultural revolution) is one 
of the three decisive levels of revolutionary 
upheaval‛ (Kossok, 1988: 44). 
The necessary renewal of the political culture 
of the left, including the LEFT PARTY, will only 
be a part of such a general cultural revolution. 
The rapid unfolding by the left of its own po-
litical culture of solidarity will strengthen it in 
the coming intellectual-political struggles for 
the way forward after the crisis, by means of a 
commonality that can overcome disagree-
ments of opinion, and through the increased 
credibility and the moral appeal of such a cul-
ture. Moreover, the cultural level of interper-
sonal relationships will, in the inevitable future 
change of ways of life, be of first-rate signifi-
cance. However, even a left culture will not 
exist outside the influences of competitive 
capitalist society, so that the change of the 
culture of the left will become a part of its pro-
ject for a just society of freedom, social equal-
ity and solidarity for all. 
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